Larry J. Zissi v. State Tax Commission of Utah : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
Larry J. Zissi v. State Tax Commission of Utah :
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lee A. Dever; Assistant Attorney General; attorney for respondent.
David J. Bird; Richards, Bird and Kump; attorneys for petitioner.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Larry J. Zissi v. State Tax Commission of Utah, No. 890317.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2659
UIHM UTAH SUPREME COURT 
D' n MrNT 
Kl 
45 9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO. 
BRIEF 
&0&7 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY J. ZISSI, 
petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 890317 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY 
CLASSIFICATION 14(a) 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
Petition for Review of Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, Final Decision of the Utah State Tax commission 
David J. Bird (#0334) 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
333 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8987 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Lee A. Dever 
Assistant Attorney General 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
life: 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY J. ZISSI, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 890317 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY 
CLASSIFICATION 14(a) 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
Petition for Review of Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, Final Decision of the Utah State Tax Commission 
David J. Bird (#0334) 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
333 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8987 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Lee A. Dever 
Assistant Attorney General 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES IN THIS 
PROCEEDING BECAUSE OF THE VIOLATION OF 
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 5 
A. United States v. Janis and I.N.S. v. 
Lopez-Mendoza are Distinguishable, and 
the Balancing Test They Employ Indicates 
the Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Proceedings . . . . 5 
B. The Exclusionary Rule Should be Applied 
to Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Proceedings 
Because They are Quasi-Criminal 14 
C. The Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in 
this Proceeding Because of the Egregious 
Nature of the Violation of Fourth 
Amendment Rights 20 
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES IN THIS 
PROCEEDING BECAUSE OF THE VIOLATION OF 
RIGHTS SECURED UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 21 
CONCLUSION 25 
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
633-34 (1886) 15, 18 
County of Henrico v. Ehlers, 379 S.E.2d 
457 (Va. 1989) 24 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) 20 
Guzzetta v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 173 
(1982) 6 
Hansen v. Public Employees' Retirement 
System Bd. of Admin., 122 Utah 44, 61, 
246 P.2d 591 (1952) 8 
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 
(1984) 1, 2, 9, 10, 
13, 14, 20 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
144 (1963) 17, 18, 19 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 22, 23 
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsyl-
vania , 380 U.S.693 (1965) 3, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 
Pizzarello v. United StatesP 408 F.2d 
579 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 
396 U.S. 986 6, 7 
Ryan v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface 
Transit Operating Authority, 466 N.Y.S.2d 
879, 120 Misc.2d 524 (1983) 24 
State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 
(1923) 21, 22, 23 
State v. Lampman, 45 Wash.App. 228, 
724 P.2d 1092 (1986) 24 
-ii-
State v. Louden. 15 Utah 2d 64, 
387 P.2d 240 (1963) 22 
Suarez v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue. 58 T.C. 792 (1972) 6 
Turner v. City of Lawton. 733 P.2d 
375 (Okl. 1986) 23 
United States v. Blank. 261 F.Supp. 
180 (N.D. Ohio 1966) 6, 7, 16 
United States v. Janis. 428 U.S. 433 
(1976) 1, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 
15, 19 
United States v. Ward. 448 U.S. 242 
(1980) 17, 18, 19 
Vander Linden v. United States. 502 
F.Supp. 693 (S.D. Iowa 1980) 6, 7 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 4, 21, 22 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-1-210 8 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-19-106(2) 16 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-19-107(2) 16 
Utah Code Annotated, Title 17, Chapter 5 8 
-iii-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner disagrees with the statement in Respondent's 
Brief at Page 35 that the evidence showed that "amphetamine sold in 
powder form [is] (sic) an altogether different substance than that 
sold in the pill form." (R. 159). In fact, the testimony referred 
to was by Kendra Herlin, a sheriff's undercover narcotics officer. 
Her testimony was that there is a chemically slight difference 
between pill amphetamines and crystallized amphetamine powder, 
which a chemist would have to explain. She also said that the 
pills and powder are different in physical appearance, the pills 
being a slightly off-white, brownish color, and the powder being 
much more white. (R. 159). Petitioner believes this point is 
important because the Tax Commission contends that pill and powder 
amphetamines are different substances, justifying their different 
treatment under the Stamp Tax, when there is no evidence to support 
that conclusion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The cases of United States v. Janis. 428 U.S. 433 (1976) 
and I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) provide guidance 
in the application of a balancing test which can provide one reason 
for application of the exclusionary rule in this proceeding. 
However, neither case controls on the facts of this case. Janis 
was the result of a determination that deterrence would not be 
2 
furthered by applying the exclusionary rule in an intersovereign 
situation. The situation in this case is intrasovereign involving 
an unconstitutional seizure by state law enforcement officers and 
an attempt to utilize the goods seized in a tax proceeding by the 
State Tax Commission. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza held that the 
exclusionary rule should not be applied to civil deportation 
proceedings because the application of the rule would allow the 
commission of an ongoing crime, because the INS has adequate 
procedures to protect against Fourth Amendment violations, and 
because the cost of imposing the rule in the streamlined 
deportation hecirings would be too high. 
This case is distinguishable, and the balancing test of 
Janis applied in this case indicates that the exclusionary rule 
should apply. County sheriffs and the State Tax Commission are 
different arms of the same sovereign. The Tax Commission has power 
to direct and receive information from the county sheriffs. Each 
is concerned with application of the laws of the State of Utah. 
And recent history shows that the power to exact large taxes or to 
seize funds or to forfeit properties are regularly used as one of 
the primary efforts in law enforcement, particularly regarding the 
possession of controlled substances. Because of that, application 
of the exclusionary rule in this proceeding will provide a 
significant deterrent effect. 
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On the other hand, there is nothing to indicate that the 
costs outweigh the benefits of deterrence. Application of the 
exclusionary rule would not result in any ongoing violations. Tax 
Commission hearing officers are or can become competent to 
determine these issues, they have not been shown to impose any 
burden which would prohibit consideration of such issues, nor has 
it been shown that such issues would be raised on any large scale. 
A second and separate basis for application of the 
exclusionary rule in this proceeding is that the Illegal Drug Stamp 
Tax is, in fact, a quasi-criminal statute like the civil forfeiture 
statute found to require the application of the exclusionary rule 
in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). 
The tax is not even applicable without violation of the criminal 
law regarding possession of controlled substances, and the tax 
imposed can be and is, in this case, far greater than the fines 
which could be imposed for violation of the criminal provisions of 
the law. The tax imposed is also approximately 150 times the value 
of the amphetamines which were seized, making the Drug Stamp Tax an 
even harsher penalty than forfeiture. These are the elements the 
Supreme Court has used to determine a quasi-criminal statute, and 
because they are present in this case, the exclusionary rule should 
apply. 
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Finally, because the violation of Fourth Amendment rights 
in this case was egregious, involving a roadblock set up at the 
whim of five sheriff/s deputies on patrol, and where there is no 
case law which would support the constitutionality of such a road-
block, this Court should hold that it would transgress the notions 
of fundamental fairness to employ the evidence seized as a result 
against Petitioner in this proceeding. For this reason, also, the 
exclusionary rule should apply. 
This Court should also apply an exclusionary rule for 
violation of the Utah constitutional provisions governing search 
and seizure. Such a result is appropriate because the application 
of the exclusionary rule in a proceeding such as this is not well-
settled, and because Drug Stamp Tax proceedings are unique Utah 
proceedings which should be limited by Utah constitutional 
provisions. Other states have imposed an exclusionary rule under 
their own constitutions, which is sometimes broader than the 
federal rule,. Like those cases, the exclusionary rule should be 
applied in this case because of the violation of Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES IN THIS PROCEEDING 
BECAUSE OF THE VIOLATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
A. United States v. Janis and U . S . v. Lopez-Mendoza are Distin-
guishable, and the Balancing Test They Employ Indicates the 
Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Illegal Drug Stamp Tax 
Proceedings. 
The United States Supreme Court held in United States v. 
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (hereinafter "Janis"), that evidence 
obtained by state law enforcement officers pursuant to a search 
warrant later proved to be defective was admissible in a federal 
civil tax proceeding, and that the exclusionary rule would not 
apply. The facts of this case are distinguishable. First, this 
case involves an intra-sovereign violation, where the State of Utah 
attempts to use evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights by the State's own officers. In Janis, the federal 
government attempted to utilize evidence obtained by state 
officers. This was a major factor in the Supreme Court's 
assessment of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. The 
Court stated: 
The additional marginal deterrence provided by 
forbidding a different sovereign from using 
the evidence in a civil proceeding surely does 
not outweigh the cost to society of extending 
the rule to that situation. Janis, supra at 
453-54. 
Janis argued that the application of the rule to civil 
6 
proceedings has long been recognized in the federal courts, citing 
cases including United States v. Blank, 261 F.Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 
1966); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2nd Cir. 1969), 
cert, denied, 396 U.S. 986, and Suarez v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue1, 58 T.C. 792 (1972), which are relied on by Petitioner in 
this case as well. With regard to those cases, the Supreme Court 
stated as follows: 
[RJespondent does not critically distinguish 
between those cases in which the officer 
committing the unconstitutional search or 
seizure was an agent of the sovereign that 
sought to use the evidence, on the one hand, 
and those cases, such as the present one, on 
the other hand, where the officer has no 
responsibility or duty to, or agreement with, 
the sovereign seeking to use the evidence. 
The seminal cases that apply the exclusionary 
rule to a civil proceeding involve "intra-
sovereign" violations, a situation we need not 
consider here. Janis, supra at 455-56. 
Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F.Supp. 693 (S.D. 
Iowa 1980) was decided after Janis and held that the exclusionary 
rule did apply in a federal tax proceeding to suppress evidence 
^he Tax Commission argues that the holding in Suarez v. 
Commissioner has been expressly overruled by Guzzetta v. 
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 173 (1982). However, Guzzetta only limited 
the application of Suarez to situations involving intrasovereign 
violations. The Tax Court stated, "In situations involving inter-
sovereign violations of the Fourth Amendment, such as the case now 
before us, United States v. Janis, supra, controls. To the extent 
that Suarez is inconsistent with Janis with respect to the 
application of the exclusionary rule, we will no longer follow our 
prior decision," Guzzetta v. Commissioner, supra, 184. 
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illegally obtained by the Internal Revenue Service. The District 
Court stated: 
The facts of the matter now before the Court 
are distinguishable from those in Janis in 
that the facts of this matter involve "intra-
sovereign" violations while in Janis the 
situation concerned an "intersovereign" 
situation. . . . 
This Court is of the opinion that the 
"deterrent effect" in an "intrasovereign" 
situation would be furthered by excluding 
illegally obtained evidence in subsequent 
civil trial proceedings. Id. at 697. 
The Tax Commission attempts to distinguish Vander 
Linden v. U.S., supra, as well as Pizzarello v. U.S., supra, and 
U.S. v. Blank, supra, because those cases involved exclusion in a 
federal tax proceeding of evidence illegally obtained by federal 
agents. The Tax Commission attempts to distinguish these cases by 
stating that Utah County is a different sovereign than the State 
Tax Commission. (Brief of Respondent at 19). The Tax 
Commission contends that the evidence illegally seized should not 
be excluded because the Commission was not involved in the illegal 
seizure. (Brief of Respondent at 24). 
In fact, this case involves an intrasovereign violation, 
like the cases relied on by Petitioner. County sheriffs and the 
State Tax Commission are each part of the same sovereign—the State 
of Utah. County sheriffs enforce the laws of the State of Utah. 
Defendants who they arrest are charged for crimes by the State of 
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Utah. The county attorney prosecutes those defendants for the 
State of Utah. Counties are created and given their powers by the 
state legislature. Utah Code Annotated, Title 17, Chapter 5. 
The county is a part of the state and is 
subject to the control of the legislature. 
Hansen v. Public Employees' Retirement System 
Bd. of Admin. . 122 Utah 44, 61, 246 P.2d 591 
(1952). 
Further, county sheriffs and other county officers are by 
statute agents of the Tax Commission for enforcement of the tax 
laws. Utah Code Annotated § 59-1-210 gives the Tax Commission the 
following powers: 
(9) to confer with, advise, and direct . . . 
county officers in matters relating to . . . 
the collection of taxes; . . . 
(14) . . . to require from all state and 
local officers any information necessary for 
the proper discharge of the duties of the 
commission. 
Not only are county sheriffs and the State Tax Commission 
parts of the same sovereign State of Utah, but the Tax Commission 
may require sheriffs to provide information to the Tax Commission 
and may direct county sheriffs in matters relating to the 
collection of taxes. The Tax Commission's attempt to distinguish 
the federal cases relied on by Petitioner fails because the county 
sheriffs and the State Tax Commission are bound by an agency 
relation in respect to collection of taxes and are each part of the 
same sovereign. 
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The Tax Commission also relies on I.N.S. v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (hereinafter "Lopez-Mendoza") to 
support its contention that the exclusionary rule should not apply 
in this proceeding. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings 
for illegal immigrants. Lope z-Mendo za did involve an 
intrasovereign violation, where INS agents unlawfully arrested the 
defendants and obtained their admissions of alienage. However, 
contrary to the Tax Commission's assertion, the Supreme Court did 
not hold that the exclusionary rule would not apply in any civil 
proceedings. The decision is limited to the facts of the case 
involving civil deportation proceedings. The Court stated that 
Janis "set forth the framework for deciding in what types of 
proceeding application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate. 
Imprecise as the exercise may be, the Court recognized in Janis 
that there is no choice but to weigh the likely social benefits of 
excluding unlawfully seized evidence against the likely causes.11 
Lopez-Mendoza, supra at 1042. 
On the benefits side of the balance, the question is the 
extent of deterrence of unlawful police conduct. Several of the 
factors relied on by the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza as reducing 
the likely value of the exclusionary rule in a deportation 
proceeding are distinguishable from this case. First, the Court 
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held that deportation would still be possible if the exclusionary 
rule is applied by the use of other evidence. In this case, where 
the substances to be taxed were found as a result of an 
unconstitutional seizure, the tax will not be applied if the 
exclusionary rule is applied. The Court also felt the deterrence 
would be minimal because "the INS has its own comprehensive scheme 
for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its officers." Id. at 
1044. There is no evidence of a similar effort by Utah County, and 
in this case there is clear evidence that any training has been 
ineffective because of the unconstitutional actions of the 
sheriff's deputies in instituting the roadblock involved here. 
This case is also distinguishable from Lopez-Mendoza on 
the cost side of the balancing test. The Court said: 
The first cost is one that is unique to 
continuing violations of the law. Applying 
the exclusionary rule in proceedings that are 
intended not to punish past transgressions but 
to prevent their continuance or renewal would 
require the courts to close their eyes to 
ongoing violations of the law. Id. at 1046. 
Application of the rule in deportation proceedings would allow an 
illegal immigrant to continue violation of the immigration law by 
his presence in the country. 
The cidministrative burden of applying the exclusionary 
rule in INS proceedings was also a factor. The Court noted that an 
INS agent may make many arrests each day, and that immigration 
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judges average six deportation hearings per day. The State Tax 
Commission has not shown any such volume of cases. There is no 
reason it could not adequately consider the exclusionary rule in 
the few Drug Stamp Tax cases it is actually called upon to handle. 
Application of the balancing test in this case shows that 
the deterrent benefits of application of the exclusionary rule in 
Drug Stamp Tax cases outweigh the costs. First, there is likely to 
be a deterrent benefit from application of the rule. In Janis, the 
Supreme Court said that concern over inadmissibility at a federal 
proceeding was unlikely to provide significant additional 
deterrence because the offending officer's zone of primary interest 
is not the federal law. Janis, supra at 458. The zone of interest 
of county sheriffs is to enforce the laws of the State of Utah. 
This includes criminal laws, including violation of the criminal 
provisions of the Drug Stamp Tax. It also includes the county 
sheriff's obligations to provide information requested by the Tax 
Commission and to act under directions by the Tax Commission in 
matters relating to the collection of taxes. The imposition of the 
Drug Stamp Tax is also within the practical zone of interest of the 
county sheriff's officers. The high taxes and penalties payable 
are an inducement to Fourth Amendment violations. Recent publicity 
regarding money seized and taxes imposed as a result of police 
seizures in drug cases demonstrates the importance attached to such 
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actions, not only by law enforcement but by the public in general. 
Deprivation of a suspect's funds and assets has became an important 
aspect of law enforcement. The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax is a weapon 
in the drug war, and sheriffs and other law enforcement are front-
line combatants in that war. Having been given the weapon, they 
will use it to take any action they can to punish a person found 
with drugs. Putting constitutional limits on the use of that 
weapon will deter future unconstitutional searches and seizures by 
eliminating the* inducement to utilize unconstitutional searches and 
seizures as a vehicle to impose the tax. 
This case is an example of that fact. Here there was an 
unconstitutional roadblock violating the rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure of every person traveling a 
highway. If the exclusionary rule does not apply in this 
proceeding, this Court would sanction such methods as a means of 
insuring compliance with the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax or other tax 
laws. The ability to cause the financial ruination of a person by 
imposition of the Drug Stamp Tax by virtue of evidence from an 
illegal search or seizure could furnish substantial incentive by 
providing the perception of success to law enforcement personnel, 
even if the evidence seized were inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings. Without the application of the exclusionary rule in 
Drug Stamp Tax proceedings, there is nothing to prevent the Tax 
13 
Commission from requesting, directing, or just tacitly encouraging 
law enforcement officers to establish unconstitutional roadblocks 
or initiating other unconstitutional searches for the primary or at 
least collateral purpose of enforcing the Drug Stamp Tax. The 
state should not be able, in a case involving unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence, to choose to proceed under the civil tax rather 
than the criminal law and thereby utilize illegally seized evidence 
to impose a tax far in excess of any fines available for the 
related criminal violations in any event. 
The costs of imposing the exclusionary rule in cases like 
this do not outweigh the deterrent benefits which would be realized 
by its application. First, the costs to society are not as great 
as in a criminal case. The exclusionary rule would not result in 
letting a criminal go free, just a prohibition of collection of a 
tax which has not been shown to result in significant revenue for 
the state in any event. 
The Court in I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, indicated 
that the exclusionary rule should be applied where egregious 
violations of Fourth Amendment rights occur, which transgress 
notions of fundamental fairness. Lopez-Mendoza, supra at 1050-51. 
Therefore, the Tax Commission will require some mechanism for 
determining egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment. The 
additional burden of determining a violation of the Fourth 
14 
Amendment, rather than an egregious violation, is small. Also, 
there will often be a prior determination in a criminal court of 
the constitutionality of the search and seizure which would be 
binding upon the parties in the tax proceeding. As pointed out 
above, unlike the situation in Lopez-Mendoza, the application of 
the exclusionary rule will not result in any continuing crime or 
violation. No one questions the right of law enforcement to seize 
and not return contraband. There is also nothing in this case to 
indicate that hearing officers of the Tax Commission are 
overburdened or face anything approaching the case load of the INS 
administrative law judges. There is no reason why the factual and 
legal issues of search and seizure law could not be adequately 
handled by the hearing officers of the Tax Commission. And there 
is nothing to indicate that the burden of doing so or that the 
volume of cases in which such issues would be raised would be 
great. For these reasons, the balancing test propounded in Janis 
and applied in Lopez-Mendoza produces a different result in this 
case and indicates that the deterrent values of applying the 
exclusionary rule exceed the costs. 
B. The Exclusionary Rule Should be Applied to Illegal Drug Stamp 
Tax Proceedings Because They are Quasi-Criminal. 
In fact, the exclusionary rule has been applied by the 
United States Supreme Court in one type of civil proceeding— 
forfeitures. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 
(1965) (hereinafter "One Plymouth Sedan"), In that case, the Court 
stated: 
A forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in 
character. Its object, like a criminal 
proceeding, is to penalize for the commission 
of an offense against the law. . . . It would 
be anomalous indeed, under these 
circumstances, to hold that in the criminal 
proceeding the illegally seized evidence is 
excludable, while in the forfeiture 
proceeding, requiring the determination that 
the criminal law has been violated, the same 
evidence would be admissible. Id. at 700-701. 
This holding was noted and approved in Janis. United 
States v. Janis, supra at 447. With regard to what is a quasi-
criminal proceeding, the Court in One Plymouth Sedan stated as 
follows: 
The information, though technically a civil 
proceeding, is in substance and effect a 
criminal one. . . .As, therefore, suits for 
penalties and forfeitures incurred by the 
commission of offences against the law, are of 
this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they 
are within the reason of criminal proceedings 
for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
of the Constitution. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan 
v. Pennsylvania, supra at 697-98, quoting Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34. 
Just as forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal, so is 
the Drug Stamp Tax. Each requires that for the penalty to be 
exacted, whether a forfeiture or an oppressive tax of 150 times the 
value of the substance seized, a finding of the commission of an 
offense is required. The Illegal Drug Stamp Tax specifically 
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states: "Nothing in this chapter requires persons lawfully in 
possession of marihuana or a controlled substance to pay the tax 
required under this chapter." U.C.A. § 59-19-107(2). In this 
case, the amount of the tax assessed was $22,000. This tax is 
greater than the maximum fine available for criminal violation of 
the Drug Stamp Tax. U.C.A. § 59-19-106(2). 
In United States v. Blank. 261 F.Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 
1966), the District Court applied the ruling and reasoning of the 
Supreme Court in One Plymouth Sedan, to a tax case involving the 
application of the federal excise tax on gambling activities. The 
Court noted as follows: 
Where, as here, there is a correlative civil 
action open to the Government which imposes a 
penalty upon the citizen commensurate with the 
criminal sanctions to which an accused, 
victimized by an illegal search, would be 
exposed, then we see no distinguishable 
difference between the two forms of punishment 
which excuses the government from complying 
with constitutional mandates when prosecuting 
their action in a civil forum. Were this not 
the case, all suspected violators of revenue 
laws would be subject to the precise evil at 
which the Fourth Amendment is directed—the 
unreasonable disruption of the privacy of the 
home—no matter how slim or unfounded might be 
the suspicion of their illegal activity. If 
there is no constitutional check on the 
"investigative" efforts of federal 
administrative officials prosecuting civil 
claims, and there exist forfeiture and 
deficiency proceedings, civil in form, which 
inflict an onerous monetary penalty upon an 
accused which approximates the visitations of 
the criminal code, there is no practical 
restraint upon such officials. United States 
v. Blank, supra at 182. 
In concluding that the exclusionary rule should apply In 
that tax case, the Court stated: 
Our decision today follows necessarily from 
the reasoning explicitly expressed by the 
Supreme Court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. 
Com, of Pennsylvania. Id. at 183. 
The Tax Commission has argued that the test for 
determining whether a proceedim ? quasi-criminal in character for 
1 >Lciusionary rule under One 
Plymouth Sedan should test *: whether a 
statute, civil i r> 5 — • should a 
crirniruil si i,it.ute -iiav. i u*. t Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
tJ , K. 144 (196 3) , Petitioner has discussed these factors at pp. 46-
47 of the Brief of IV t it IUIKMI MI MI IN i.'a:...* , in IW<»VII» m , Midi itehi is 
more stringent than the test for whether a statute Is quasi-
criminal for purposes of applying the exclusionar uxe. Some 
cc -
 iendment privilege against 
double jeopardy, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, can only 
be violated if there is a criminal proceeding. But; tiip" Fourth 
Amendmei i t ri ght against unreasonable searches and seizures can be 
violated whether or not a criminal proceeding ensues, ~ inquiry 
into the Kennedy v •_ Mendo z a -Mar t i ne z £ a • "* t o r s d - ^ • - • e t: in .i. ne 
whether the suit is quasi-criminal, In United States v. Ward, 448 
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U.S. 242 (1980), which has been cited by both Petitioner and 
Respondent, the issue was whether a requirement that discharges of 
oil into navigable waters be reported violated the privilege 
against self-incrimination because it could lead to a civil penalty 
for the discharge. After first determining that the Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez factors did not indicate that the statute imposing 
the civil penalty was, in fact, criminal, the Court went on as 
follows: 
Our conclusion that § 311(b)(6) does not 
trigger all the protections afforded by the 
Constitution to a criminal defendant does not 
completely dispose of this case. Respondent 
asserts that, even if the penalty imposed upon 
him was not sufficiently criminal in nature to 
trigger other guarantees, it was "quasi-
criminal," and therefore sufficient to 
implicate the Fifth Amendment's protection 
against compulsory self-incrimination. United 
States v. Ward, supra at 251. 
This issue involved interpretation and application of 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), a case which was also 
relied upon by the Court in One Plymouth Sedan. The Supreme Court 
in United States v. Ward quoted the Boyd opinion as follows: 
As, therefore, suits for penalties and 
forfeitures incurred by the commission of 
offences against the law, are of this quasi-
criminal nature, we think that they are within 
the reason of criminal proceedings for all the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution, and of that portion of the Fifth 
Amendment which declares that no person shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself. . . . United States 
v. Ward. supra at 252, quoting Boyd v. United 
States at 634. 
Although the Court went on in United States v. Ward to 
find that * penalty imposed - discharge of oi1 in navigable 
waters wa <* na 1 ys i s I the C :)ii :IL:I : t: makes 
clear that the seven factors stated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 
do not control whether a civil penalty is so far quasi-criminal as 
t ::::> :ii .nvoke the pro tec I: - amendment and the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
This Court should recognize that the Illegal Drug Stamp 
r
 ; l . Its object Is to penalize for the 
commission of the offense of possession of controlled substances. 
The tax cannot be applicable w:i thoi I t: £ « :i o] a I the : x:i in :i nal 
] aw, and the tax itself far exceeds the maximum fine? m a criminal 
proceeding for either the possession of controlled substances or 
f o r i T i.m i n.ii I > :i o l a t: * »",» » < » , Hroceed i ntjs such as 
this for assessment Illegal Drug Stamp Tax will always 
require 3 "inding that two criminal laws have been vio.-^ed. 
I possession of controlled 
substances and, second, the criminal provisions of the Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act itself. FIM »h<?si> reasons, I hi,1- Cour," should 
recognize that, regardless of the results of balancing under the 
Janis test discussed supra, the exclusionary rule applies to 
proceed i h-'f' ""intlei Un" lll"'|.il MiU'-i SI-imp "' . because "it i« in 
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fact, a quasi-criminal proceeding in its character. For these 
reasons, this Court should hold that the exclusionary rule applies 
to Drug Stamp Tax proceedings. 
C. The Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in this Proceeding Because 
of the Egregious Nature of the Violation of Fourth Amendment 
Rights. 
The Supreme Court in I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra. in 
holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil 
deportation proceedings, noted: 
We do not deal here with egregious violations 
of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that 
might transgress notions of fundamental 
fairness and undermine the probative value of 
the evidence obtained. Id. at 1050-51. 
The Court indicated that where egregious violations 
occur, the exclusionary rule should apply. For that reason, as 
well, the exclusionary rule should apply in this proceeding. The 
roadblock in this case occurred ten years after Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648 (1979). In the intervening years, dozens of cases 
have interpreted that watershed Supreme Court decision with regard 
to roadblock seizures. Petitioner has not found one case in which 
a roadblock set up in the discretion of officers in the field has 
been held to be constitutional. The Tax Commission apparently 
concedes this issue, having not even addressed it in the Brief of 
Respondent in this case. The roadblock at issue here is an 
egregious violation of Fourth Amendment rights, not only 
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Petitionee .-,« I'til also a 1.1 other drivers on the roads of Utah 
officers on patrol decided amongst themselves to institute A 
roadblock, the effect - . ..utionally seize 
every vehicle which happened alone Let-* was.- no warrant obtained, 
no direction from administrative officers regard! i iti trie 
establishment -1, m.'i'\i Petitioner 
believes the facts ;.: -s constitute : egregious violation 
such that the use of the evidence obtained by virtue of the sei zure 
would transgress notions of I: undamental fairness. For that reason, 
also, this Court should hold that the exclusionary rule should be 
applied • should clarify the stilus1 »# 
r e * J- • • . *Y\ 
II. 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES IN THIS PROCEEDING 
BECAUSE OF THE VIOLATION OF RIGHTS SECURED UNDER 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTTTTJTION 
Petitioner argued in his earlier brief that the roadblock 
in this case was unconstitutional under Article I , hpction i i of 
the Uta> -jer the United States 
Constitution. However, the issue of the application of the 
exclusionary rule for r olations of the Utah " 'mist™ 11 u1 i oh was 
separately .id dressed. The .^ v Commission cites the Court to State 
v. Aime, 62 Utah - !. 704 (1923)
 ( which Im-itJ i hit 
exclusionar needing where evidence was 
obtained in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution« State v. Aime has never been expressly overruled• 
However, in State v. Louden. 15 Utah 2d 64, 66, 387 P. 2d 240 
(1963), this Court stated: 
We have no disposition to disagree with the 
doctrine that where police officers have 
obtained evidence by illegal methods, such as 
unlawful search in violation of the IV 
Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sec. 14 of our Constitution, it 
should not be used to convict a person of 
crime, as held by the United States Supreme 
Court in the case of Mapp v. Ohio. Although 
there are admittedly older decisions of this 
Court which indicate that under certain 
circumstances, evidence even though unlawfully 
obtained, may be used as evidence. 
The Court in Louden appears to adopt the exclusionary 
rule for violations of Article I, Section 14 in the case of 
criminal proceedings, thus implicitly disapproving State v. Aime. 
This Court's recent pronouncement of interest in a separate Utah 
constitutional jurisprudence regarding Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution, cited in Petitioner's brief at Page 25, also 
indicates the tacit assumption that the exclusionary rule applies 
for violations of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
This Court should rule that the exclusionary rule applies 
in this Drug Stamp Tax proceeding because the controlled substances 
on which the tax is assessed were discovered as the result of a 
seizure which was unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution. 
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one reason toi. this Court to so rule i s that, there is no definitive 
statement from the U.S. Supreme Court *<="^ . The policy 
arguments and reasor *ppiy equally 
with regard hr application u\ exclusionary rule for 
violation Constitution * Stamp Tax 
proceeding, .. our D 
rule on the application of the exclusionary rule here because the 
Drug Stamp Tax is a unique Utah statutory provision whicli m,iy" not 
he analoqouu. l.o ..iny provisions on whioh I lie li S Supreme Court may 
eventually rule. 
Unfortunately, there is v&- y m t i e 
jurisprudeno I,J" on Llii.i\ question,. However, there are cases from 
other states which provide guidance. First, before Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 u.o. otj o ^ 0 1 / ! 
proceedings, there was a spl I t of authority among the states as to 
whether the exclusionary rule applied for violation of state 
constitutional provisions This split ni authority was d iscussed 
by this Court in State v. Aime, supra. More recently, other states 
have held the exclusionary rule to be »c':r-
proceedi i lgs * h< = i: e sta tie cons11tutiona 1, r igUt * regarding search ir n 
seizure have been violated. The Oklahoma Supreme Court i? 
that under the Oklahoma ''onsr't i tuHon I ho i x< ,L, -I~ 
i n civil and criminal cases. Turner v. City of Lawton. 
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733 P.2d 375 (Okl. 1986). The courts of Washington have held that 
the exclusionary rule is more restrictive under the Washington 
Constitution than the federal exclusionary rule, and have applied 
the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings. State v. 
Lampman, 45 Wash.App. 228, 724 P.2d 1092 (1986). 
The Tax Commission cites the Court to County of Henrico 
v. Ehlers, 379 S.E.2d 457 (Va. 1989) as a state court which has 
refused to apply the exclusionary rule in civil cases. That case 
dealt with whether the exclusionary rule should apply in an 
interpleader action, a situation much different from this 
proceeding. Also, that case did not deal with state constitutional 
law, but interpreted only the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Contrary to the Virginia Court, the courts of New 
York have held that evidence unconstitutionally seized for the 
purpose of a criminal investigation may not be subsequently 
utilized in a civil proceeding. See Ryan v. Manhattan & Bronx 
Surface Transit Operating Authority, 466 N.Y.S.2d 879, 120 Misc.2d 
524 (1983), and cases cited therein. 
For the reasons stated, and like the courts of 
Washington, Oklahoma, and New York, this Court should hold that the 
exclusionary rule applies in Drug Stamp Tax proceedings where the 
substance to be taxed is seized in violation of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner requests that 
thi s < "lon il In in 11 in I mid i I in nyc I un i onary nil I e app J j es i in 1 1 legs , Trncr 
Staiap Tax proceedings where Fourth Amendment or Article 
Section rights have been violated Petitioner requests that 
t r • . .s case violated both the 
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, for the reasons stated in the Brief of Pet.i 1.1 a run-
ner contests and disagrees with many of 
the assertions and arguments made by the Tax Commission regarding 
other issues in this case, Petitioner" i>el ieves M naf h is ear I iei; 
briet adequately addresses and anticipates the Tax Commission's 
arguments. Therefore, Petitioner believes those issues need not be 
addressed HUM I II IMII r r»f * * i \ tiio imiil hi 111:» oaf Iiei brief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this it day of February, 1990. 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KDMP a V ', 
David J / B i r d 
Attorneys for Peti t ioner 
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